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Abstract 
 
Tax reform in small emerging democracies is difficult to measure what 
effects is likely to produce due to countries’ aggregate political and economic 
vulnerabilities. If both are taken as remaining relatively stable, then it is easier 
to discuss what impact the reform introduced may have in the economy and her 
stakeholders. In absence of a monetary policy, the Government of Kosovo in 
mid-2008 adopted the changes in tax rates taking effect from January 2009, 
with the aim to foster economic growth and improve business competitiveness at 
least in the regional market of the Balkans. This article critically assesses the 
proposed and approved changes by the Government that were in line with the 
proposals made by business community Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), and concludes that this tax reform is not well thought-out and properly 
analyzed to expect the benefits for which it was too optimistically hoped for, 
especially in relation to key stakeholders such as the Government’s budget, 
business development, and consumers.  
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Proposed and approved tax rate changes  
 
For a long time, a number of NGOs and the overwhelming majority of 
businesses had identified tax rates in place as the main barrier to Kosovo’s 
economic growth. They considered lowering of tax rates as indispensable 
towards business development and improving competitiveness. Many 
proposals by individual NGOs, namely by the organizations defending the 
interests of business community, were addressed to the United Nations 
Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Government of Kosovo. 
After remarks by the UNMIK that the NGOs should speak with one voice or 
have their demands jointly addressed, a more unified proposal was made. A 
document by Investment Promotion Agency of Kosovo (IPAK) entitled “A 
Proposal for Changing of Fiscal Policies: Investment Incentives” of July 04, 
2008 proposed the following tax rate changes: Corporate Income Tax (CIT) to 
be halved from 20% to 10%, Personal Income Tax (PIT) with a progressive rate 
to be also halved from 20% to 10% for monthly incomes of over €450, Value 
Added Tax (VAT) to remain unchanged at a flat rate of 15%. The same 
document contained the proposals of main NGOs that represent and defend 
the interests of business community. The Alliance of Kosovan Businesses 
(AKB) had the following proposals for tax rates: CIT 8%, PIT 8%, VAT 3% and 
17%; American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) CIT 7%, PIT 7%, VAT 16%; 
and, Kosovo Chamber of Commerce (OEK) CIT 7%, PIT 7% and 12%, and VAT 
15%.1 All these three business associations were trying to justify that a sharp 
decline in the CIT rate would provide greater opportunities for investment in 
production sector, generate employment, increase tax revenues and the 
demand for consumption goods, shift away a large proportion of the population 
from social assistance, and substantially lower fiscal evasion. The NGOs came 
to a conclusion that such a tax reform would lead to a better general economic 
welfare.  
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On July 28, 2008 the Government appears to largely have complied with 
the demands of these NGOs and the IPAK when it approved the proposal of 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to change the rates in taxation 
scheme. The decision was expected to come into force on January 2009 and is 
now in full force. The MEF’s approved proposal had the following tax rate 
changes: CIT to be halved or decreased from 20% to 10%; VAT will increase 
from 15% to 16%; excise tax to be increased for several items, among which, 
tobacco will be charged a new amount of €21 (up from €17) per kilogram; and 
PIT for salaries in excess of €450 to be lowered from 20% to 10%.  Few weeks 
before this change was proposed and introduced, the three business 
community NGOs had the following proposals for the PIT rate: AKB 8%, 
AMCHAM 7%, OEK 7% and 12%.  
Before discussing on potential impact and effects of all proposed changes 
in tax rates, it is worth referring to a report by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) about Kosovo prepared during April 21 – 29, 2008 or before the 
NGOs and the MEF presented their proposals. The IMF’s report appreciated 
some improvements in fiscal discipline, though it accused the MEF for poor 
budget planning and weak expertise in spending it. Given Kosovo’s limited 
taxation base, the MEF that the desire to decrease the CIT rate should not go 
under 15% due to implications it can have for budget revenues. The most 
serious objection was addressed to insufficient efficiency of the Tax 
Administration of Kosovo (TAK) for which, urgent improvements were 
recommended. This sector of collecting tax revenues for Kosovo’s budget, was 
advised to establish a comprehensive system of registering the taxpayers, files 
and payments. Without a substantial improvement in the presumably 
outdated IT system, any move to change the tax rates may be very little useful, 
if not at all. Kosovo’s tax system was regarded as relatively good and simple 
compared to that of the countries in the region.2 In general, concerns expressed 
were that without a sound strengthening of the TAK’s management and 
efficiency, the existing taxation system as well as proposed changes, will 
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neither produce any impressive result nor will lower the very high share of 
informal sector of the economy for which, the business community NGOs and 
IPAK were convinced that only lower tax rates will significantly reduced it. 
 
What the proposed and approved changes aim to achieve and where 
they can lead? 
 
It is not difficult to discuss about economics and make good proposals on 
how to achieve certain goals. Jokes about studying economics at the Pristina 
University perhaps nowhere were told by non-economists.3 But to what extent 
the MEF et al proposals were and are in line with encouraging economic 
growth and welfare? To answer this question, it is crucial to consider one 
important fact; poverty in Kosovo is widespread. A recent report by the World 
Bank estimates that around 45% of Kosovo’s population lives in poverty line, 
and close to that percentage is the unemployment rate.4 These two indicators, 
however, should not be identified as synonymous despite that they may be 
strongly correlated. There are people who are employed but fall in the category 
of poverty due to their very low level of earnings, as there are also people who 
are jobless and do not belong to the group of those who live in poverty. The 
latter group may depend on others, e.g. remittances which in Kosovo, by 
different estimations vary from 10% to 15% of GDP. A further discussion 
between unemployment and poverty seems not to serve any useful purpose 
here. What is more relevant to remember is that close to half of Kosovo’s 
population lives in poverty line. Their incomes are mostly spent on everyday 
consumption goods. Yet, spending the entire incomes in daily consumption 
may not be sufficient for 15% of the population estimated to live in extreme or 
food poverty. By increasing the VAT from 15% to 16%, consumption for the 
poor may become more expensive. The rise of VAT, excluding other factors, is 
likely to force businesses to raise the prices of consumption goods, the final 
burden of which will fall on consumers. To sum it up, the new VAT rate 
further deteriorates economic conditions of almost half of the population, plus 
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it may bring additional people into poverty line, ceteris paribus. The process of 
castling between the rise in VAT and fall in PIT that the Government thinks 
will keep sustainability or neutrality in budget revenues, is also not a carefully 
planned or smart policy.5 The large number of population which is unemployed 
does not have regular incomes that the TAK would evidence in her deficient 
tax register system. What importance for state budget revenues will have the 
rise or fall in the PIT rate for the people who do not have formal earnings or 
are not registered with the PIT system? Or, the Government thought that this 
can be taken as a VAT in consumption?  
Sharp decrease in the CIT rate without more detailed analysis is 
another mistake and hurried decision of the Government having potential 
implications for budget revenue sustainability. Corporations are entities that 
have more resources and incomes than the poor and the unemployed. It was 
constantly overemphasized that the CIT at 20% is very high, and as such, it 
puts Kosovo in a disadvantageous competitive position against neighboring 
countries to attract foreign investment. As a matter of fact, the CIT rate in 
Albania is 20%, FYR Macedonia 12%, Montenegro 9%, and Serbia 10%. 
However, VAT rate in Albania is 20%, FYR Macedonia 18%, Montenegro 17%, 
and Serbia 18%. In addition, these countries have other types of taxes that 
Kosovo has not yet introduced, such as social security contributions that vary 
from 9.6% in Montenegro to 21.7% in Albania, then, property transfer tax, and 
so on.6 The problem is not with higher or lower rate of taxes alone to decide for 
investors to invest in Kosovo or elsewhere. Foreign investors, apart from the 
CIT, pay other taxes which, in the neighboring countries appear to be higher. 
True, lower tax rates are a significant incentive to attract investors, though 
many studies for transition economies have indicated that this makes sense 
only if a considerable number of other supportive measures are in place.7 Also, 
it is not rational to assume or take it as a clear cut that a sharp reduction in 
the CIT rate will make foreign investors to invest more or the part that they 
were eligible to pay to the state under the previous tax rates. It may happen 
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that they transfer their entire profit, and they are free to do so under the 
provisions to expatriate the profit, to their accounts abroad as it happened in 
Albania with pyramid schemes that brought about the collapse of the state. If 
the state collects more taxes from corporations, then it can invest the same in 
public goods or use it alternatively in projects of general welfare, the effect of 
which will obviously be observed. The shortcomings in the case under 
consideration, rely on well grounded and justified remarks for the TAK and the 
MEF in planning, managing and spending the budget. It has been reported 
and frequently made public in the media that many foreign companies 
operating in Kosovo have over €40 million unpaid taxes. There are foreign 
investors as well as domestic businesses that do not pay taxes. All were 
released from fines and penalties for hiding taxes by a decision of the MEF, 
just after the new tax rates were approved. The tax amnesty was applicable 
until 2009. How much further the Government wants to encourage them? To 
think that halving the tax rate makes the taxpayer honest that s/he will 
voluntarily come to pay, is wrong. Even if the CIT was to be reduced to 5%, the 
taxpayer will never pay whenever it has the opportunity to do so. Collecting 
taxes is not a desire or incentive on the side of entities eligible to pay – it is an 
obligation enforced and executed by the state. A popular proverb in the United 
States says: “If someone has died while being asleep, s/he probably has been 
dreaming about being prosecuted and punished by the state authorities for not 
paying taxes”.  But the Government of Kosovo does not have difficulties in 
making the budget ends meet. The grave concern is with the way how the 
budget is spent and not used. As of 2007, the cumulative budget surplus was 
around 40% of total budget of the same year. Collected but not spent revenues 
left many deficiencies in providing public goods and services.  
The Government takes the problem of reforming the tax system as a 
basic concept from the textbooks of economics and thinks it can work as it is 
written there. In the Government’s view, a decline in the CIT rate should 
encourage or bring foreign investors in who would invest and employ more 
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people, then reinvest the profit, employ additional people, and pay more taxes 
to the state that would subsequently cause budget revenues to rise. All these 
were probably to result in higher economic growth rate and better welfare. 
This chain effect may only work under the assumption if other factors are 
taken as constant, which in Kosovo, more than in any other European country, 
are less likely to remain.   
What is expected to happen from the Government’s new tax rates or 
castling between the VAT and the CIT is more or less known. This system 
aims at further increasing of income differences between the very few rich by 
making them richer, and the very large proportion or almost half of the 
population in poverty even poorer. The rise in income differences is a 
significant limitation factor in economic growth and development in transition 
economies.8 The problem becomes more severe for those economies facing 
massive unemployment rate and widespread poverty such as Kosovo. The 
Government seems not to have properly calculated as what it wants to achieve 
in a nascent independent country at the time when it needs more resources to 
finance her expenditures, provide a better environment for businesses and 
cope with ongoing deterioration of economic conditions of the population, 
whose very low purchasing power constrains business development and 
growth. Economic growth rate estimated at 3% in 2008 was generally 
considered too small for inroads to change the current socio-economic 
situation. The Government’s projected economic growth rate with unreliable 
data at 6% for 2009 has been moderately called by many economists as too 
optimistic, and in extreme form as a political propaganda. The politicians too 
often fail to understand that economy is the biggest politics for the state. It 
appears that the Government is not interested to make the state stronger with 
the tax changes it made. These changes to some extent are not castling but 
twaddling scheme.  
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MEF and the TAK continue to misinform taxpayers  
 
The MEF and its department of tax revenue collection – the TAK never 
wanted to correct a technical error and wrong information they were and still 
are transmitting to businesses and the population on the VAT rate of change. 
This (on purpose or who knows for what reason) mistake has persisted from 
the day when the MEF proposed the change and the Government approved it 
on July 28, then on December when the Assembly of Kosovo voted the changes 
in tax rates. The government authorities and high ranking officials reported 
and the media broadcasted the rise of VAT from 15% to 16% as an increase of 
only 1%. The same belief is present among them even today and may be in the 
future. As such, it was not correct then, neither is today nor it will ever be in 
the future. Here is a simple argument with elementary school mathematics 
that an increase in the rate of VAT from 15% to 16% or by one percentage 
point, is an increase precisely by 6.67%: 1/15 x 100 = 6.67. If an item before tax 
has a price of €100 and the consumer buys it in the shop increased by VAT at 
15% or with a total price of €115, the buyer pays the seller and this one to the 
TAK the sum of €15 as VAT. From January 2009, the same item will cost: 
€100+16% VAT = €116. Instead of €15 that the buyer has been paying by the 
end of 2008, s/he will pay €16 or €1 more, which is 6.67% more.9  
 
Example:  
 If a book has a price of €20 and the reader buys it with VAT included at 
a rate of 15% or €3, then total price of the book is €23. The price of the same 
book from January 1, 2009 becomes: €20+16% VAT (or €3.20) = €23.20. 
Comparing the book’s price with VAT in 2008 and 2009, the overall increase in 
price is €0.2 or 20 euro cent. Expressed in percentage terms, total price is 
0.2/23x100 = 0.87%. One may think that this is what the Government, MEF, 
TAK, NGOs, businesses and the citizens thought when being informed about a 
1% increase in VAT. Let us remind once again: the Government did not 
introduce or adopt any price reform, but the change in the VAT rate. The 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
 9 
Government is only interested in the tax rate of those products which from 
15% has increased to 16%. What was this increase when implemented in the 
case of the book just mentioned? Instead of €3, the TAK will now collect €3.20 
as a VAT, or 0.2/3x100 = 6.67% more. That is how much more the businesses 
will have to pay and how much more the TAK will collect. That is all about the 
“confusion” and irrational mathematics in calculating the rise in the VAT rate 
from 15% to 16%.     
 Following the new VAT rate, a likely immediate increase in prices by 
0.87% may force businesses to price their products higher because they will 
now pay an increased taxed by 6.67% to the state. Apart from this burden 
which will fall on consumers, businesses have two alternatives to cover the 
loss. One is to increase sales and reduce costs. The other would be to partially 
go in informal sector in order to survive competition in the market. Businesses 
typically strive to avoid paying or hide taxes, whereas the duty of tax 
authorities is to keep them in check and bring into formal sector. Kosovo has 
the highest share of informal sector in Europe. Given the “expertise” of the 
TAK, the MEF, their local advisors paid by USAID/Bearingpoint as 
contractors with no accountability whatsoever, it can be argued that in Kosovo 
there are more businesses paying taxes than the TAK deserves to be paid.  
A logical question arises: why all these concerns for a technical error in 
calculation that the TAK continuously, on purpose or accidently, is selling to 
the media, businesses and the citizens? There is only one simple answer – the 
VAT is the main tax revenue for Kosovo’s budget. In 2007, VAT accounted for 
35% of all budget revenues. Yet, for 2009 it is projected to rise to 44%. The 
share of excise taxes in total budget revenues in 2007 was 21%. Although the 
MEF maintained that this indirect tax along with the VAT will cover the 
difference in revenues lost by lower rates of CIT and PIT, the contribution of 
the tax in question – the excise tax is projected to increase by only four 
percentage points to represent 25% of the 2009 Kosovo’s budget revenues.10 
Since the VAT is the largest contributor to the budget, it should be viewed 
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from another perspective that deserves more attention. Kosovo’s trade deficit 
is amazingly large where, the value of exports in 2007 covered only 10% of 
total imports, a figure projected to slightly improve to around 14% by the end 
of 2009. According to official data, foodstuffs and beverages dominate total 
value of imported goods, in the overwhelming majority of which VAT was 
collected. Taken the VAT revenues in total, over 85% of them were collected on 
imported with the rest on goods and services produced at home.11  
Last but not least remark. The Government after approving the rise of 
VAT, signed the memorandum with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) to reach the Millennium Goals, an event which was given 
a great publicity in the media, in particular to one of the eight Millennium 
Goals – to halve the proportion of people living in poverty line by 2015. Despite 
the rhetoric by the Government itself to be deeply committed to this and the 
rest of the Goals, the new tax reform adopted involving the rise of VAT is the 
first step off the track or backwards in the short to medium term as the year 
2015 is not far.   
 
Conclusions and remarks 
 
 Tax reform in emerging democracies and transition economies often 
involves two scenarios preceding a faster consensus: first, poor expertise and 
practice in policy making characterized by knowledge constraints; and second, 
more professional and diversified thoughts enabling better decisions. The case 
of Kosovo’s Government and the business community NGOs discussed in this 
article, is an example of the first scenario. When the thoughts are similar for 
complex issues such as tax reform without detailed analyses and profound 
justification for the final decision taken and put into operation, discrepancies 
emerging from actual results and those expected, to a large extent can be 
blamed on how policy reforms were prepared and adopted. Business 
associations do not seem to sufficiently defend the interests of the entities they 
represent, except talking about the problems and make superficial proposals 
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instead of more active lobbying to exercise pressure to the Government for 
their demands. It is not quite clear whose interests the Government is 
defending in economic affairs when it has conflicting objectives in tax policy 
reform. As the decision to rise the VAT rate was centralized and ignored 
concerns of small businesses and the consumers, so is the determination of few 
larger businesses with direct ties to the Government to lower the rates of CIT 
and PIT – to centralize the power in the hands of the few or a tiny small group 
interest by marginalizing and pushing into deeper poverty the army of the 
unemployed and the poor.  
  Tax reform in Kosovo is more difficult to be designed, implemented, 
monitored and measure their expected impacts. If the system has a limited 
number of taxes in place, a thorough and detailed investigation which tax 
rates to lower and/or increase is not an easy decision to be made when it 
requires a consensus between the players involved and affected. It is more 
preferable if the decision to reform is dependent on what attainable goals 
wants to reach with available resources. The goals should be distinguished 
from desires or emotional feelings and the likely effect what actual system in 
operation can have.  
Changes in tax rates for a certain development direction are an easy 
task of the Government. However, there is one task still remaining a 
significant challenge for the Government itself and that is, improving the 
TAK’s performance. Kosovo is in the process of becoming the newest member 
of the IMF and subsequently of the World Bank. The IMF’s remarks addressed 
to the Government about urgent improvements in the TAK’s efficiency were 
not ignored.  And what improvements occurred since then until the tax reform 
entered into force nine months later? The TAK increased “efficiency” in 
another segments – it continued to misinform the taxpayers about the amount 
of money they have to pay after increasing the VAT rate from 15% to 16%. A 
change between percentages indicates ratios, not differences.  
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